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ABstRACt. We investigate the potential competition between multifamily and condominium 
developers for raw land throughout the U.S. When considering the entire sample period, we find 
evidence that condominium developers paid, on average, more for land than their multifamily 
counterparts. Alternatively, when we separate the sample into low versus high-growth locations 
and two time subperiods, we observe that the premium is not entirely consistent. The average 
premiums appear to be largely a result of the high-growth locations from 2004 to mid-2008. 
Indeed, the results demonstrate that condominium developers paid over 60 percent more for 
land in high-growth states during the later subperiod. This extraordinary premium calls into 
question the price formation process in these locations.
KeYwoRDs: High-density residential land; Condominium development; Apartment develop-
ment; Construction market; Undeveloped land
1. INtRoDUCtIoN
We examine a potential relationship be-
tween the multifamily space market and the 
condominium asset market. Generally, the 
space and asset markets are considered sepa-
rate with demand and supply equilibriums 
unique to each marketplace. In the space 
market, demand consists of renters willing to 
pay to use space for consumption or produc-
tion purposes while supply consists of property 
owners willing to rent such space to users. In 
contrast, the asset market is made up of buy-
ers and sellers concerned with the amount and 
timing of cash flows. Agents in the asset mar-
ket determine market prices using the three 
main factors of opportunity cost of capital, 
growth expectations, and risk.
Based upon the difference in these two 
markets, a conclusion could be reached that 
condominium developers in the asset market 
and multifamily developers in the space mar-
ket are two different types of agents. Condo-
minium developers focus on the eventual price 
per square foot they can command upon sale of 
the development project while apartment de-
velopers focus on rents and occupancy rates. 
Hence, even though both developers produce 
high-density residential buildings, the separa-
tion of their respective markets implies they 
function in divergent arenas.
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But the fact that both condominium and 
apartment developers use land eventually 
zoned for high-density residential use as the 
foundation for their respective projects makes 
us question whether they are indeed two dif-
ferent types of agents. Indeed, while the land 
is one input of products destined for use and 
sale in divergent markets, we expect that the 
renter in a multifamily complex will desire 
many of the same neighborhood characteristics 
as a condominium owner e.g., close to shop-
ping, transportation, and entertainment. Ac-
cordingly, these two agents should compete in 
the development portion of the real estate sys-
tem given the substitutability of raw land for 
either use. And given the generally fixed and 
limited supply of land in most metropolitan ar-
eas in the short term, we should expect price 
formation and property valuation based upon 
both parties’ demand for the same property.
The contrary nature of these two thoughts 
suggests a quantitative study examining 
whether there exists any consistent interac-
tion between multifamily and condominium 
developers for the purchase of land. We can 
envision the full spectrum of possibilities. 
When the rental market is strong, multifamily 
developers may be able to outbid condominium 
builders. Of course, the reciprocal is also true 
when condominium sale prices are better. In 
contrast to these two boundaries is the poten-
tial for no systematic relation as both agents 
are able to compete and build projects in the 
same localized area.
When we formalize the research question of 
whether a systematic price relationship exists 
for high-density residential land, we initially 
find that condominium developers pay a pre-
mium. However, when we divide the sample 
based upon states that experience a lower ver-
sus higher appreciation in prices, we observe 
an inconsistent premium. In states with be-
low-average growth from 1999 to 2003, we find 
condominium developers paid nearly 9 percent 
more than their multifamily counterparts. 
While the results demonstrate a premium of 
similar magnitude in the above-average growth 
markets during the same time period (1999-
2003) and the below-average growth markets 
from 2004 to mid-2008, the coefficient is sta-
tistically insignificant. 
In contrast to the marginal premium in the 
previous three subsamples, the results demon-
strate that condominium developers paid over 
60 percent more for land than multifamily de-
velopers from 2004 to mid-2008 in the above-
average growth markets. As we have come to 
know, 2004-2006 was an exuberant period in 
real estate, potentially to the point of irrational 
valuation in certain markets. Thus, the results 
suggest that the ability to sell condominiums 
during this period eclipsed the rental market 
such that condominium developers possibly 
paid speculative prices for the property. Of 
course, the excessive premium paid by condo-
minium developers calls into question the price 
formation process in above-average growth 
markets and the validity of these transactions 
as sales comparables.
In summary, the lack of a consistent price 
premium implies the ability of both types of 
developers to be competitive within a local-
ized market. This fact is entirely consistent 
with observed market behavior. We describe 
the empirical evidence supporting this summa-
tion as well as provide additional information 
about the two different development markets 
in the remainder of the paper.
2. ReCeNt MARKet CoNDItIoNs
We examine the sample period from 1999 to 
mid-2008, which clearly corresponds to a bull 
market in the real estate industry. After the 
burst of the Internet bubble in 2000, investors 
began to look more seriously at real estate as 
an alternative investment to stocks and bonds. 
This interest came on the heels of falling real 
estate prices during the 1990s due to decreases 
in occupancy rates and rents. As capital poured 
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into real estate after 2000, prices began to re-
bound. The price increases were pronounced 
in residential real estate and throughout the 
developed world save Japan and Germany. 
Based upon the S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. index, 
residential property appreciated 109 percent 
from 1999 to the peak in 2006–an average rate 
over 10 percent per year.
As residential values appreciated, home-
owners found an extra asset on their person-
al balance sheet in the form of home equity. 
Paired with low interest rates brought on by 
the Internet bust, many owners realized the 
equity through sale or borrowed against it by 
refinancing their homes. Subsequently, these 
owners used some of the acquired funds to 
stimulate their general consumption and the 
overall economy. In a similar manner, condo-
minium owners participated in the boom of 
the broader residential housing market. As 
example, the average New York City condo-
minium appreciated over 17 percent per an-
num from 1999 to the peak at the end of 2005 
based upon the S&P/Case-Shiller condomini-
um index. Hence, in the context of this paper, 
condominium owners realized an increase in 
wealth based upon their equity position as 
compared to apartment renters. Presumably, 
the increase in condominium prices in the as-
set market promoted additional condominium 
development and a propensity for condomini-
um developers to bid up the land price. 
We see a similar reaction in a condomini-
um-conversion study by Benjamin et al. (2008). 
They find that Miami-Fort Lauderdale condo-
minium converters paid a premium for apart-
ment complexes during the growth period from 
2004-2006. They attribute the premium to con-
dominium converters updating the property’s 
occupant mix or letter grade–something not 
afforded to renters. In the context of our anal-
ysis, we question whether there is a similar 
price formation in U.S. land based upon asset 
versus space markets.
3. ReLeVANt tHeoRY AND 
LIteRAtURe
As best as we can determine, this paper 
is the first to consider the valuation of land 
used in the development of high-density resi-
dential property. Alternatively, the context of 
our empirical study fits within the well known 
Real Estate System. Figure 1 presents a visual 
overview of the system as shown in Geltner 
and miller (2001). 
Figure 1 shows the three main elements of 
the System–the space market, the asset mar-
ket, and the development industry. Within 
the space market, the current stock of physi-
cal space interacts with tenants’ requirements, 
which determines rents and occupancy. The 
output of the space market is cash flow, which 
is one component of a specific property’s value. 
The other factor that assists in determining a 
property’s market value is the market required 
capitalization rate, which itself is a function 
of investors buying and selling. Of course, 
the space and asset markets are affected by 
overall economic conditions, which, along with 
the capital markets, lead to forecasts of future 
supply and demand.
The other element where future forecasts 
are a crucial input is the development indus-
try–the focus of our study. From the asset 
market and the associated property market 
values, developers consider the profitability of 
new supply. As Geltner and miller (2001) point 
out, a key component of the development proc-
ess is the opportunity value of the land. This 
opportunity value is determined in the asset 
market since land is an investable asset.
The interaction of the three primary ele-
ments of the real estate system can be rep-
resented graphically in a general equilibrium 
framework. The models of Fisher (1992) and 
diPasquale and Wheaton (1992) allow for long-
run comparative static analysis of the relation-
ship between the real estate space and asset 
markets. Geltner and mei (1995) formally 
specify the Fisher (1992) and diPasquale and 
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Wheaton (1992) models using the asset return 
identity 1 1 1log( )+ + +≈ +t t t tr P D P , and obtain a 
first-order Taylor expansion of 
1 1 1log (1 ) log log+ + +≈ α + ρ + − ρ −t t t tr P D P
1 1 1log (1 ) log log+ + +≈ α + ρ + − ρ −t t t tr P D P  (1)
where the parameter ρ is the average asset price 
scaled by the sum of the asset price and cash 
flow, and the constant α is a nonlinear function 
of ρ. Following Geltner and Mei (1995) as well 
as Eppli et al. (1998), Equation (1) can be re-
written as an expectational difference equation 
and, by not allowing for explosive rational asset 
prices, can be solved forward as
1 1
0 0
log (1 ) (log ) ( ).
1
∞ ∞
+ + + +
= =
α
= + − ρ ρ Ε − ρ Ε
− ρ ∑ ∑
i j
t t t j t t j
j j
P D r 
1 1
0 0
log (1 ) (log ) ( ).
1
∞ ∞
+ + + +
= =
α
= + − ρ ρ Ε − ρ Ε
− ρ ∑ ∑
i j
t t t j t t j
j j
P D r  (2)
Equation (2) shows that the observed asset 
price is equal to the expected discounted value 
of all future cash flow (Dt + 1 + j) less future re-
turns (rt +1 + j). These factors provide linkage as 
the cash flows account for expectations in the 
space market and the returns reflect expecta-
tions in the capital markets; both of which im-
pact the value of the property in our study.
While not as formal as Geltner and mei 
(1995) and Eppli et al. (1998), we can sum-
marize well the main research hypothesis of 
this paper using diPasquale and Wheaton 
(1992) model, which we reproduce in Figure 2. 
The dotted rectangle–the vertical and hori-
zontal sides of which connect between tangent 
points in each quadrant–represents long-run 
equilibrium. The point where the sides of the 



































Figure 1. The real estate system.
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stock of built space, rent, asset prices, and the 
rate of new construction (q*, R*, P*, and C* 
respectively).
To decompose the model, we begin in the 
southeast quadrant, which represents the clas-
sical stock and flow nature of the real estate 
system. That is, the slope of the line in the 
southeast quadrant is the relationship between 
the stock of real estate and the flow of con-
struction required to retain such a stock in the 
steady state. This is the level of construction 
required to cover depreciation, abandonment, 
and demolition. 
drawing a vertical line through the cur-
rent supply of real estate stock (q*) into the 
northeast quadrant, we find the determina-
tion of equilibrium rent. The price per square 






















Figure 2. The Four-quadrant model of diPasquale  
and Wheaton (1992).
through q* intersects the demand function in 
the northeast quadrant. The slope of the de-
mand being a function of rent and exogenous 
economic conditions.
Given R*, the northwest quadrant is the well-
known present value relationship. The asset 
market valuation process relates equilibrium 
property pries (P*) to equilibrium rents (R*) 
with the resulting slope of the line from the 
origin being the familiar cap rate. The steeper 
this line, the higher the cap rate. 
Lastly, drawing a vertical line down from 
the cap rate determined by equilibrium rent 
and price, we arrive in the southwest quad-
rant and the market for new construction. 
This quadrant presents the operation of the 
development industry–the focus of this study. 
The southwest quadrant simply presents the 
supply curve for real estate construction. 
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While demand is in terms of flow (i.e. price is 
measured by rents), developers will decide how 
much new real estate to supply depending on 
the asset valuation. Thus, the relevant price 
in the southwest quadrant is the asset price. 
That is not to say that income-producing prop-
erty such as a multifamily development does 
not value interim rents. Instead, these rents 
are capitalized into asset value; equilibrium 
asset prices being the ultimate determinant of 
new construction–whether multifamily or con-
dominiums development.
Additionally, the construction line depicts 
the positive relation between asset prices and 
new development. For example, higher prop-
erty prices will allow for previously unjustifi-
able construction to begin. The construction 
line intersects the price axis at a positive 
amount instead of at the origin because con-
struction will halt if prices fall below a certain 
threshold. Given the value of assets from the 
northwest quadrant, a vertical line from con-
struction cost curve and then over to the verti-
cal axis determines the level of new construc-
tion (C*) where construction costs equal asset 
prices. The horizontal line through C* thus 
completes the four-quadrant diagram with the 
level of construction linking with the equilib-
rium stock of built space where they intersect 
in the space market.
In summary, both the Real Estate System 
and the diPasquale and Wheaton (1992) model 
show the potential competition between mul-
tifamily and condominium developers. In both 
models, developers will bid for land based upon 
the property market value in the asset market. 
Consequently, our first investigation is to de-
termine whether one property type systemati-
cally realizes higher returns over the other such 
that the developer of that property type could 
consistently outbid the competitor. Using data 
from moodys/Real and the National Association 
Figure 3. National quarter returns for apartment and condominium complexes.
Apartment data from moodys/Real Commercial Property Index.
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of Realtors, Figure 3 shows that systematically 
higher returns did not accrue to one property 
type over the other from 2001 to 2008. In fact, 
the split of higher returns is almost even–out 
of the 31 quarterly observations in Figure 3, 
apartment returns were higher in 17 instances 
while condominiums realized higher returns in 
14 quarters. 
4. ReseARCH DesIgN
Since the national returns of one property 
type are not consistently higher than the other, 
we next examine specific land transactions 
designated for condominium or multifamily 
development. We obtain all U.S. transactions 
in the CoStar database from 1990 to August, 
2008. We remove the observations prior to 
1999 since there are only 22 for the 8-year pe-
riod. Additionally, we remove 64 records for a 
lack of data required in subsequent empirical 
models. The final dataset consists of 5,623 ob-
servations.
Upon finalizing the sample, we again inves-
tigate an initial systematic relationship; this 
time in the property-specific transaction pric-
es. We compute the mean and median prices 
for each year to examine if one property type 
consistently realizes smaller prices since low-
er land costs will assist a developer with the 
overall property return. Figure 4 displays the 
results. It is not entirely clear from Figure 4 
that there exists a consistent relation between 
these summary prices. Both the mean and me-
dian prices are higher for land designated for 
multifamily development from 1999 to 2001. 
Conversely, land designated for condominiums 
garnered higher mean and median transaction 
prices during 2002–2005. Beginning in 2006, 
condominium median prices are lower but the 
Figure 4. mean and median transaction prices  
for land designated for either condominium  
or multifamily development.
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mean prices are mixed relative to multifamily 
mean values. Since neither the national returns 
nor the specific transaction prices yield a sys-
tematic relation between the property types, we 
proceed with empirically modeling the price of 
each transaction. We model six main determi-
nants of price. Table 1 details summary statis-
tics sorted by the eventual development type.
table 1. This table presents descriptive statistics for U.S. land designated for either  
condominium or multifamily developments
mean median Std.  dev. minimum maximum
Condominium developments (N = 2,571)
Price $3,645,929 $1,435,000 $8,431,366 $30,000 $185,000,000
SqFT 208,248 45,624 512,997 344 9,401,119
Income $52,387 $50,846 $8,451 $35,952 $83,646
Res demand 57,593 26,349 14,295 676 68,918
OutState 0.08 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00
CBd 6.52 4.95 4.86 0.09 19.95
Yr1999 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.00 1.00
Yr2000 0.14 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00
Yr2001 0.11 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00
Yr2002 0.12 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00
Yr2003 0.13 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00
Yr2004 0.17 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00
Yr2005 0.17 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00
Yr2006 0.08 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00
Yr2007 0.04 0.00 0.21 0.00 1.00
Yr2008 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.00
multifamily developments (N = 3,052)
Price $2,964,719 $1,349,500 $5,967,609 $36,500 $136,500,000
SqFT 402,891 95,091 1,295,815 609 40,553,488
Income $52,799 $52,719 $7,714 $36,212 $84,729
Res demand 29,956 29,324 15,033 594 73,335
OutState 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00
CBd 6.52 5.43 4.56 0.03 19.98
Yr1999 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.00 1.00
Yr2000 0.14 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00
Yr2001 0.15 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00
Yr2002 0.14 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00
Yr2003 0.15 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00
Yr2004 0.14 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00
Yr2005 0.11 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00
Yr2006 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00
Yr2007 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.00
Yr2008 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00
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The first rows in the panels of Table 1 show 
that the overall mean and median prices paid 
by condominium developers are greater than 
multifamily developers. We confirm that this 
is not a function of extreme outliers. When 
we remove the two highest price observations 
from the condominium panel–which leaves a 
maximum value lower than the maximum in 
the multifamily subset–the condominium mean 
and median prices ($3,515,525 and $1,435,000, 
respectively) are still greater than the multi-
family prices.
Alternatively, land designated for multi-
family development exhibits a larger footprint 
than condominium-designated properties. 
The square feet size of condominium land is 
208,248. The size of multifamily-designated 
land is almost twice the area at 402,891 square 
feet (the median size of multifamily-designated 
is greater than 200 percent). There are five ob-
servations in the multifamily subset that are 
greater than the largest condominium parcel. 
When we exclude these potential outliers we 
observe similar maximum values across both 
datasets. However, we still find that the mul-
tifamily mean size is 361,278 while the median 
is 94,089; amounts greater than the condomin-
ium-designated subset.
While the summary statistics suggest that 
the average price paid by condominium devel-
opers for residential property is greater than 
multifamily developers–especially in light of 
the notable difference in footprint–there are 
clearly other determinants of land transaction 
prices. We include these explanatory variables 
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The main variable of interest is dev Type 
and the associated coefficient δ. dev Type is a 
dichotomous variable coded as 1 for land des-
ignated for condominium development or 0 for 
multifamily-designated land. Any significant 
value for δ demonstrates one type of develop-
ment designation has an effect on transaction 
prices–the null hypothesis being δ = 0.
A challenge in modeling land prices is that 
there are not many individual-properties char-
acteristics to control for. Clearly, the size of 
the property can be a determinant, thus we 
include square feet (SqFt) and square feet 
squared (SqFt2) as price should increase as 
the property size increases but at a decreas-
ing rate.
Beyond individual characteristics we look 
to determinants within the metropolitan area. 
We control for the income of a metropolitan 
area as a demand-side driver of the market. 
We also proxy for residential housing (Res 
demand), which is the total apartments units 
permitted in a given metropolitan area. Of 
course, the change in population will also in-
fluence the demand for residential housing. As 
miles et al. (2007, p. 20) note, real estate devel-
opment is a function of not just an increase in 
population but an increase in population with 
purchasing power. We find changes in popula-
tion and employment are correlated at greater 
than 0.98, therefore, we include the change in 
employment in the model.1
Ostensibly, the key component to any spe-
cific parcel of land is its location. Since there 
are not distinguishing features such as build-
ing size and construction material for property, 
a developer will probably determine a bid price 
largely on the location of the parcel to other 
amenities. due to its importance, we control for 
location two ways. First, in keeping with the 
classic bid-rent curve, we geocode the property 
location and compare it to the central business 
_____________
1 We capture employment and population levels using year 
dummies.
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district. The variable, CBd, is the number of 
miles of separation distance between the sub-
ject property and the central business district. 
The second method to capture specific location 
is to use the actual Cartesian {x, y} coordinates. 
A study by Fik et al. (2003) demonstrates that 
the absolute location of a parcel has a unique 
location-value signature that can be captured 
through the Cartesian coordinates. This meth-
od is potentially better than distant gradients 
or numerous dummy variables given the in-
determinable number of externalities that af-
fect a property’s value. The variables, Latitude 
and Longitude, are the Cartesian coordinates. 
Consistent with Fik et al. (2003), we also use 
Latitude2 and Longitude2–squared values of 
the base latitude and longitude.
The last control variables are OutState 
and dichotomous variables for each year in 
the sample period.2 Lambson et al. (2004) find 
that out-of-state buyers pay a premium for 
commercial real estate, hence, we include a 
dummy variable to capture this effect.
5. eMPIRICAL ResULts
We begin the empirical analysis by ap-
plying the model to the full sample of land 
transactions. Column 1 in Table 2 details the 
results. The coefficient on the main variable 
of interest, dev Type, is 0.22 and statistically 
significant. Using Kennedy (1981) for correct 
interpretation of a dummy variable in semi-
log equations, the coefficient value equates to 
a premium of $759,338 paid by condominium 
developers, on average–the mean price for all 
land in the sample being almost $3.3 million.
_____________
2 We also investigate the T-bill rate as a proxy for cost of 
capital. This proxy is highly correlated with the year vari-
ables and causes multicollinearity in the model. We use 
the dichotomous year variables in lieu of the proxy for the 
cost of capital since the dummies for each sample year 
allows us more flexibility i.e., some other market charac-
teristic or shock may affect prices in any one year that may 
not be observed in the specific T-bill rate.
table 2. The table reports coefficients and 
heteroscedasity-consistent t-statistics (in 
parentheses) of models used to explain the natural 
logarithm of transaction price for a sample of 
U.S. land designated for either condominium or 
multifamily development
Full Sample 1999–2003 2004–2008
(N = 5,623) (N = 3,254) (N = 2,369)
dev Type 0.22 0.13 0.36
(7.71)*** (3.34)*** (5.81)***
SqFT 4.81 5.97 4.11
(*10−7) (7.19)*** (5.35)*** (0.76)
SqFT2 −1.24 −1.87 −0.09
(*10−4) (−2.56)** (−1.73)* (−0.09)
Income 0.25 0.24 0.24
(*10−4) (9.70)*** (6.81)*** (6.05)***
Res demand 0.08 0.05 0.12
(*10−4) (8.36)*** (3.88)*** (7.20)***
OutState 0.51 0.43 0.56
(10.69)*** (7.42)*** (7.02)***
CBd −0.02 −0.02 −0.01
(−5.79)*** (−6.02)*** (−1.02)
ΔEmployment −0.04 −0.05 −0.02
(−2.07)** (−1.93)* (−0.24)
Latitude −0.19 −0.20 −0.16
(−6.51)*** (−5.32)*** (−3.15)***
Latitude2 0.00 0.00 0.00
(5.11)*** (4.23)*** (2.48)**
Longitude 0.10 0.08 0.12
(5.95)*** (3.63)*** (3.47)***
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Full Sample 1999–2003 2004–2008










Intercept 21.08 17.16 6.20
(25.16)*** (6.15)*** (1.18)
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.17 0.19
Sample period is 1999 to mid-2008.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 10, 
5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
many of the other covariates also explain 
national land transaction prices. As expected, 
values increase with the size of the parcel 
(SqFT) at a decreasing rate (SqFT2). There 
is also a positive relationship between land 
prices and greater metropolitan area income 
as well as the total apartments units permit-
ted in a given metropolitan area. Another pos-
itive relation, which is rather substantial, is 
the premium paid by out-of-state buyers. The 
0.51 parameter estimate implies a premium of 
$2,037,667.
At the bottom of Column 1, the various year 
dummies exhibits a difference in price over the 
sample period. Using 1999 as the base, the re-
sults demonstrate that 2000-2003 prices are 
similar to 1999, however, 2003-2008 prices are 
statistically different. To examine the impor-
tance of this possible structural break in prices 
over time, we split the sample and report the 
results in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.
Splitting the sample into two time periods 
appears to further refine the results as the an-
nual qualitative variables are not highly sig-
nificant for either Column 2 or 3. We observe 
that the Dev Type coefficient changes materi-
ally. The results for 1999-2003 in Column 2 
demonstrate that the difference paid by con-
dominium versus multifamily developers de-
creases relative to the full sample from 0.22 to 
0.13 ($371,000). Conversely, the dev Type co-
efficient increases for 2004-2008 to 0.36. This 
equates to a substantial premium of $1,272,430 
paid by condominium developers.
The value of the dev Type appears to be of 
such importance that it subsumes the explana-
tory value on SqFT and CBd. Further, whereas 
the t-statistic on the intercept in the full sample 
in Column 1 is over 25 standard errors from 
zero, the constant term in Column 3 is not sig-
nificant. The final item we note–in addition to 
the fact that the latitude and longitude vari-
ables are significant across all models–is the 
difference in the premium paid by out-of-town 
buyers for the two time periods. From 1999-
2003, the premium of 0.43 equates to $1,613,623 
while the premium in the later period is 0.56 or 
$2,254,270–an increase of 40 percent.
5.1. geographic location
We are generally not surprised that there 
exists a structural break creating two distinct 
time periods. Clearly, 2004-2007 was an ex-
hilarating time in commercial real estate. Re-
turns on the NCREIF national index are 7.28, 
6.75, and 9.00 for 2001-2003 and 14.49, 20.06, 
16.60, and 15.85 percent from 2004 to 2007. 
But we question whether these differences in 
returns are a reflection of differing time pe-
riods or a function of exuberance in specific 
markets. For example, it has become common 
knowledge that certain markets in California, 
Arizona, Nevada, and Florida were quite “hot” 
during the later time period of our sample. We 
note that the 2004-2007 NCREIF returns for 
the West portion of the U.S. are 15.34, 21.04, 
18.45, and 18.29 percent versus 12.50, 14.10, 
11.46, and 13.52 percent for the South region, 
respectively.
To determine if geographic location has an 
effect on the value multifamily and condomin-
ium developers pay for land, we separate the 
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sample into two subsamples using the stand-
ard deviation of transaction prices for each 
state. Scheinkman and xiong (2003) show that 
an outcome of an asset bubble is an increase in 
price volatility. Hence, we split the sample into 
low standard deviation (low-growth) versus 
high standard deviation (high-growth) states 
and model transaction prices. Table 3 details 
the states and standard deviations.3
table 3. The table reports the standard  
deviation of the natural logarithm  
of trans-action prices by state































Separating the sample by standard devia-
tion yields the findings in Table 4. The results 
for the low-growth subsample in Column 1 
demonstrate a premium paid by condominium 
developers of 0.11 or $308,468. Alternative-
ly, condominium developers paid a premium 
of 0.32 or nearly $1,077,000 for land in the 
_____________
3 The CoStar database yields observations from 30 states, 
however, 6 states offer less than 5 observations each. We 
require at least 30 observations to be in the subsample.
states that experienced the greatest range in 
transaction prices. The net effect is that condo-
minium developers paid more than three times 
the amount for land in high priced states over 
what condominium developers paid in states 
where the price did not increase as much. Ad-
ditionally, the dev Type seemingly subsumes 
the importance of lot size, residential demand, 
and the latitude and longitude variables. Of 
note, out-of-state buyers pay a higher premi-
um in the high standard deviation states–0.47 
($1,815,292) versus 0.64 ($2,700,285).
table 4. The table reports coefficients and 
heteroscedasity-consistent t-statistics (in 
parentheses) of subsamples split by the standard 
deviation of the natural logarithm of transaction 




























































Adjusted R2 0.27 0.25
Observations are U.S. land designated for either 
condominium or multifamily development and span 
the sample period from 1999 to mid-2008. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 10, 
5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
5.2. Differing times and places
With the sample split based upon the range 
of prices within states, the results in Table 4 
demonstrate the same structural break across 
the sample years as the full sample in Table 
2. due to the enduring importance of the di-
chotomous time variables, we divide the sam-
ple into four subsamples using both low and 
high growth as well as early (1999-2003) and 
later (2004-2008) time periods. Table 5 reports 
the findings.
We observe a remarkable variance in the 
amount the two types of developers pay for 
land. The low-growth subsample during 1999-
2003 exhibits a premium of 0.11, which is 
similar to previous results. But, whereas the 
magnitude of the parameter estimates on dev 
Type are similar in Columns 2 and 3 (i.e., 0.14 
and 0.13), the coefficient estimates are not sta-
tistically significant. The p-values of these two 
slope coefficients are approximately 0.12.
The distinct finding in Table 5 is the mar-
ginal slope on dev Type in the high-growth 
markets for the period from 2004 to mid-
2008. The coefficient is 0.52, which equates 
to a premium paid by condominium develop-
ers of $2,027,060. Using kennedy (1981), this 
amount is a 61 percent average premium paid 
by condominium over multifamily developers. 
And since this is an average amount, some 
condominium developers paid even more, all 
else equal. This stands in stark contrast to the 
insignificant marginal slopes for low-growth 
states during the same period as well as the 
same high-growth states during the earlier 
time period. Indeed, the dev Type appears to 
be of such importance that the intercept in 
Column 4 is not significant.
Regarding other independent variables: (i) 
we note that income is a consistent determi-
nant across markets as is residential demand; 
(ii) the magnitude of the marginal slope on 
SqFT is quite high in Column 4 (1.50) relative 
to the other specifications; and (iii) out-of-state 
buyers pay a significant premium for land in 
all four models, with the coefficient estimates 
increasing in size across specifications. The 
out-of-state parameter estimate of 0.71 in the 
high-growth states from 2004 to mid-2008 is a 
premium of approximately $3 million or nearly 
double the price, on average. Lastly, we also 
observe that the year dummies are basically 
insignificant, which demonstrates that the 
models account for the time-series trends and 
splitting the samples across time is necessary. 
Likewise, the unique findings on Dev Type 
also implies the need to split the sample across 
above-average and below-average growth mar-
kets to determine the underlying nature of the 
price formation.
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table 5. The table reports coefficients and heteroscedasity-consistent t-statistics (in parentheses) of 
subsamples split by the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of transaction prices  
(the dependent variable) as well as two time periods. YR1999 is the base year for  













dev Type 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.52
(2.22)** (1.55) (1.51) (7.59)***
SqFT 0.06 0.04 0.09 1.50
(*10−5) (5.05)*** (0.77) (1.18) (3.45)***
SqFT2 −0.18 −0.08 −0.39 −2.08
(*10−13) (−1.56) (−0.10) (−0.22) (−1.22)
Income 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.21
(*10−4) (4.60)*** (3.65)*** (5.56)*** (3.63)***
Res demand 0.07 0.11 −0.06 0.09
(*10−4) (2.76)*** (4.03)*** (−1.88)* (2.07)**
OutState 0.41 0.48 0.56 0.71
(5.96)*** (5.70)*** (5.15)*** (5.53)***
CBd −0.01 −0.01 −0.04 −0.02
(−2.71)*** (−0.95) (−5.43)*** (−2.47)***
ΔEmployment 0.00 −0.06 −0.10 0.02
(0.14) (−0.67) (−2.44)** (0.21)
Latitude −0.27 −0.35 −1.99 −1.05
(−4.95)*** (−3.27)*** (−2.69)*** (−1.90)*
Latitude2 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01
(4.16)*** (2.04)** (2.61)*** (1.88)*
Longitude 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.06
(2.06)** (2.04)** (1.36) (0.92)
Longitude2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

















Intercept 12.41 11.28 55.40 19.94
(3.53)*** (1.90)* (3.57)*** (1.47)
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.24 0.16 0.23
The sample consists of U.S. land designated for either condominium or multifamily projects from 1999 to mid-2008. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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6. CoNCLUsIoN
In the process of investigating the compe-
tition between multifamily and condominium 
developers for raw land throughout the U.S. 
from 1999 to mid-2008, we find (i) that there 
exist two distinct subperiods during the sample 
and (ii) a difference between lower- and high-
er-growth states. After accounting for these 
different subsamples, the results demonstrate 
that condominium developers pay a premium 
for land. However, the premium is not always 
statistically significant, thus, we can not infer 
a domination of the condominium product over 
the long run.
Despite the lack of a significant relation 
across all subsamples we observe a tremendous 
premium paid by condominium developers in 
the high-growth states during the heady pe-
riod from 2004 to mid-2008. Indeed, some con-
dominium developers paid a premium greater 
than 60 percent over the transaction prices for 
multifamily designated property.
In addition to determining a possible re-
lation between prices for multifamily versus 
condominium-designated land, the findings 
provide an important valuation conclusion. 
The extraordinary premium calls into question 
the price formation process in the high-growth 
states. In this regard, the premium is a cau-
tionary warning to valuers using transactions 
in these areas as sales comparables. Indeed, 
the exuberant period in the mid-2000s may 
cause valuation issues in all types of future 
appraisals.
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sANtRAUKA
RINKOS KONKURENCIJA DĖL GYVENAMŲJŲ SKLYPŲ  
SU DIDELIU GYVENTOJŲ TANKUMU
Matthew L. CYPHeR, Darren K. HAYUNgA
Savo darbe nagrinėjame potencialią konkurenciją tarp daugiabučių namų ir kooperatinių namų vystytojų 
dėl žemės sklypų visoje JAV teritorijoje. Nagrinėdami visą imties laikotarpį, aptinkame įrodymų, kad ko-
operatinių namų vystytojai už sklypus vidutiniškai mokėjo daugiau nei jų kolegos, statantys daugiabučius 
namus. Kita vertus, suskirsčius imtį į lėtai ir sparčiai besivystančias vietoves bei du laikotarpius, pastebima, 
kad priemoka ne visiškai pastovi. Regis, priemokų vidurkį iš esmės lemia sparčiai besivystančios vietovės 
ir laikotarpis nuo 2004 m. iki 2008 m. vidurio. Iš tiesų rezultatai rodo, kad per šį laikotarpį kooperatinių 
namų vystytojai sparčiai besivystančiose valstijose už sklypus mokėjo per 60 proc. daugiau. Tokia neįtikėtina 
priemoka verčia abejoti tose vietovėse taikomu kainodaros procesu.
